


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The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

Patrick Bratton

Abstract: India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context? The article will firstly discuss the concept of joint operational commands and then theories of organisational military change. Secondly, it will look at the debate in India about jointness and these commands, and how this led to the creation of the ANC. Lastly, it will conclude with observations about the ANC and the future of similar commands in the Indian context. Unless disaster or political events incentivise Indian politicians to force change on the defence establishment, it is unlikely that there will be any further joint operational theatre commands (like the ANC) in the future, but joint operational functional commands (like the strategic forces command, SFC) are more likely.

India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint regional command for the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The development of jointness and joint operational commands has been very slow in India. Moreover, there is a specific puzzle about the establishment of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). The geo-strategist would automatically assume that the strategic position of the Andaman and Nicobar islands would be an obvious focus for Indian strategic planning and development. However, the Indian civilian and military leadership has been slow to develop and exploit this strategic location. Why has this been the case? The ANC thus provides an excellent opportunity to examine the current debate about jointness and specifically joint operational commands within the Indian security community.

This article seeks to examine the following questions:

- Why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command?
- Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context?
- What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

It will firstly discuss the concept of joint operational commands and then theories of organisational military change. Secondly, it will look at the debate in India about

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jointness and these commands, and how this played into the creation of the ANC. Lastly, it will conclude with observations about the ANC and the future of similar commands in the Indian context. Unless disaster or political events incentivise Indian politicians to force change on the defence establishment, it is unlikely that there will be any further joint operational theatre commands (like the ANC) in the future, but joint operational functional commands (like the strategic forces command, SFC) are more likely.

Joint operational commands

One of the key aspects of US hard and soft power has been the US military's joint operational commands.¹ These can be a functional command that unifies units with similar functions across services (like SOCOM for special forces and USTRANSCOM for logistics) or a regional/theatre command that unifies all the various service assets in a particular geographic area (PACOM for Asia-Pacific, CENTCOM for the Middle East, etc.).² The success of the joint authority of these combatant commanders in operations after the Cold War, like JUST CAUSE (Panama), DESERT STORM (Iraq, 1991) and DELIBERATE FORCE (Bosnia), stands in contrast to the difficulties and inter-service squabbling of Grenada and Lebanon in the early 1980s.³ While the general argument for joint operational commands (and the arguments against them) tended to focus on their advantages for forward presence or power projection, a case can also be made for them in terms of territorial defence and dealing with non-traditional security issues.⁴ Because joint operational commands have a regional perspective and tremendous resources at their disposal, they can be useful when dealing with non-traditional security issues, in particular in terms of coordinating assets.⁵

Many other major powers have joint operational commands (either functional and/or theatre/regional commands), in particular those states with power projection capabilities like the UK and France, but also those Commonwealth countries that are active in defence matters, like Australia, Canada and New Zealand.⁶ Moreover, even large, developing countries like China and Russia, which have traditionally worried more about territorial defence than power projection, have regional joint operating commands.⁷

In contrast, India has not had any joint operational commands for the first 50 years after independence. While each service has its own regional commands, they are not joint and not in the same geographic location (in the west the air force has one command, while the army has two, etc.).⁸ In 2001, the Indian ministry of defence created its first joint operational theatre command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), in Port Blair in the Indian Ocean. There has been much opposition—both from inside and outside the military—to jointness and the setting up of joint operational commands like the ANC, and this makes its creation all the more remarkable.

Organisational military change

The above begs the question: if joint operational commands are common amongst the great powers, why did it take India so long to develop them? Why is the 'joint' innovation so difficult, particularly in the Indian context? The traditional explanation makes the case that military innovation will likely emerge from an external threat or problem that will cause the civilian leadership to force change on a reluctant military that will resist efforts to change.⁹ As Barry Posen writes: 'In general, only civilian intervention

can shake loose these inter-service treaties and jealousies to produce an integrated grand strategy'.¹⁰ The example *par excellence* is the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which originated as a Congressional legislation in response to US expeditionary difficulties in Grenada and Lebanon.¹¹

In terms of a realist explanation, one would expect to see India respond to changes in the international system. For example, if India were concerned about the rise of Chinese military power and its expansion into South East Asia and the Indian Ocean, it would seek to reform its military and defence organisations to better meet the possible threat. One could hypothesise that the creation of the ANC resulted from a civilian leadership forcing integration on a reluctant military as an appropriate response to deal with China.¹² However, this view does not match up well with the Indian defence experience, which has been marked more by incrementalism than radical reforms and initiatives to deal with threats. The reforms implemented in the wake of disasters and surprises like the 1962 war with China, the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks have been more changes of degree than of kind. In the case of India, perhaps 'the dogs that do not bark' have more to say.¹³

Social learning theories posit that policy is normally structured around a set policy paradigm. In the words of Peter Hall, the ideas of this paradigm 'specified what the [policy] world was like, how it was to be observed, which goals were attainable through policy, and what instruments should be used to attain them'.¹⁴ In terms of learning, there are three orders of changes. The first-order change is essentially conducting policy through standard procedures in response to events, and it is normally marked by incrementalism. The second-order change takes place when the instruments of policy are modified but 'without radically altering the hierarchy of goals behind the policy'.¹⁵ The third-order change involves a radical reformation of the paradigm, essentially replacing the old paradigm with a new one. This happens when 'supporters of the new paradigm secure positions of authority over policymaking and are able to rearrange the organisation and standard operating procedures so as to institutionalise the paradigm'.¹⁶ It goes beyond internal policy changes inside the government but also involves a wider debate and the evolution of thinking in society,¹⁷ for example the radical shift of the US in the 1940s from being a regional power with weak national security institutions into one which saw itself as a global superpower with a robust national security state.¹⁸ According to social learning theory, although the end results of third-order change are similar to those predicted by realism, the path to that end will be more difficult and convoluted.

Jointness and joint operational commands in the Indian Context

The policy paradigm for higher defence organisation in India is marked by the separation between civilian and military leadership, and lack of jointness between the individual services.¹⁹ After independence, a strong divide was created between the civilian leadership, the bureaucracy and the uniformed services.²⁰ The uniformed services were not integrated with their civilian counterparts in the ministry of defence (MoD).²¹ As a result, by the early 1950s the military leadership contributed little to political and strategic issues, but maintained a great deal of autonomy in military matters.²² The service chiefs effectively wore two hats: they would have staff/administrative duties and also be the operational commanders of their services.²³

This lack of effective communication between civilian political leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the military has been evident in many of the conflicts in

India's recent history.²⁴ Similarly, in peace and wartime, the services were mostly independent of each other. They were free to create separate doctrines and procurement plans, and they tended to fight parallel rather than joint campaigns during wartime.²⁵ While a joint military doctrine was released in 2006, it remains classified and comments by the defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee, on its release indicate that this was seen as a limited first step: 'There is a need to evolve a road map toward furthering the process of joint commands'.²⁶

In the aftermath of the surprise of the 1999 Kargil War, many former policymakers, military leaders and defence experts called for drastic changes to the existing system.²⁷ This movement was spearheaded first by the Kargil Review Committee (1999–2000) and then by the group of ministers (GoM, 2000–2001), and their subsequent reports.²⁸ The doyen of the Indian strategic studies community, the late K. Subrahmanyam, encapsulated the view for the reformers:

KRC [Kargil Review Committee] said that the decision-making process and procedures and organisation were 52 years old, formulated by Lord Ismay on the higher direction of war. India's Army, Navy and Air Force were all inherited from the British just like the police force and the judiciary. Unfortunately, we have not done anything to think for ourselves in all the above mentioned spheres and make our own legislation over the last 60 years. Since then, there has been the emergence of nuclear weapons and the revolution in military affairs. There has been no attempt to think about these developments in respect to India's security. The type of armed forces that we should have or the future should be the subject matter of a high-powered independent commission.²⁹

Essentially, for some, it seemed that the existing defence paradigm of the Indian state was obsolete in the new strategic situation. India was in the 21st century with a command structure better suited for the mid-20th century.

Of all the recommendations made by the GoM report, three are of the most interest to this subject: integration of the services both with each other and with the MOD; the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS); and joint operational commands.³⁰ With regard to integration, as the Kargil Review Committee observed, 'India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside of the apex governmental structure'.³¹ In terms of integrated commands, the Lok Sabha's (lower house of parliament) Standing Committee on Defence also stated in its 14th session: 'The Kargil Review Committee had observed that there was serious lack of synergy amongst the three Services of Armed Forces. Apart from that, there was also lack of coordination between the Armed Forces and Civil authorities'.³²

However, this does not mean that there is consensus on what reforms are necessary within the services themselves, or the larger security community. Of all the services, the navy has been the most consistent proponent of more jointness and the creation of a CDS and unified commands. Much of this has to do with the navy's need to operate in a maritime-littoral environment and also to project power from the sea to land, which intrinsically involves cooperation with the other services.³³ This also has to do with the navy's interest in non-traditional security issues in the Indian Ocean region, which call for great inter-service cooperation. One can speculate that since the navy is the smallest service, it has the least to lose if there are radical changes in defence structures, making it easier for it to be pro-reform.³⁴

In contrast, the air force tends to be the most resistant to concepts of jointness that focus on the creation of either a CDS or theatre commands. This has much to

do with both the history of the air force and its organisational and operational culture. Historically the air force has resisted being seen as only a supporting arm of the army and has fought to secure an independent strategic role (air control/supremacy, and strategic targeting inside the enemy country).³⁵ In terms of organisational and operational culture, the air force strongly resists the ‘top-down’ approach to jointness of a CDS and theatre commands, and counters that jointness needs to come from the ‘bottom up’ by ensuring jointness first at the planning and acquisition stage, and in the MoD in general.³⁶ The air force strongly believes in the primacy of ‘indivisible air power’ and centralising its assets in order to effectively use them in wartime.³⁷ This makes the air force hostile to the idea of parcelling out assets to dedicated theatre commands.³⁸ This is particularly true since the resource procurement levels are generally not viewed as being adequate for meeting the needs of existing command structures, let alone theatre commands.³⁹

The army lies between these two extremes and is divided into two camps. One group of reformist officers takes a line similar to the navy’s and calls for increased jointness and the creation of both a CDS and theatre commands.⁴⁰ On the other side are officers who are concerned about border conflicts and internal insurgencies and feel that theatre commands are unsuited for India.⁴¹ There is a general perspective amongst these officers that joint operational commands are only useful for power projection, and not for defence or border security.⁴² Given the operational demands of various security duties at the internal level (Jammu and Kashmir, the northeast, etc.) and the border level (some 8,000–9,000 miles of disputed borders), the army tends to focus on more current, practical matters than possible future reforms. Lastly, there are also concerns regarding ‘losing’ commands to the other services because most of the border commands tend to fall under the army bailiwick for addressing internal and border security issues. There is opposition to giving over commands to air force or naval officers in areas where the army is actively engaged in operations and has the most assets.

One must also add that while this fear is not always expressed, the services are concerned that the objective behind integrated commands is to reduce the power of service chiefs.⁴³ As mentioned earlier, the service chiefs are both staff officers and operational commanders. Any evolution from the current system to one of a CDS and theatre commanders would result in the service chiefs being deprived of their operational command.⁴⁴ In the words of Prakash: ‘One would like to emphasise the fact that since no Chief would like to preside over his own divestment, it is unrealistic to expect a favourable recommendation for the CDS system from the Services’.⁴⁵

Beyond the services, it is more difficult to determine the position of the politicians and civilian bureaucracy with regard to integrated commands and jointness in general. Civilian politicians are generally not particularly interested in questions relating to defence.⁴⁶ The exceptions are the few dedicated MPs that serve on the Standing Committee on Defence in the Lok Sabha. Judging by their consistent questioning of MoD officials about why recommendations on further jointness and the CDS were not followed up by the bureaucracy, one can surmise that they are both supportive of further reforms, and are frankly surprised that more integration has not been accomplished since 2001.

The position of the bureaucracy on integrated commands and jointness is perhaps harder to determine. The bureaucrats are widely acknowledged to be the most influential actors in terms of defence, and act as the principal interface between the civilian decision-makers and the services. However, given their powerful position, they are often criticised on several counts for: (1) being a ‘wall’ between the two groups;

(2) having limited knowledge about or interest in defence issues; and (3) being resistant to change.⁴⁷ In addition, given their resistance to the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Defence on the integration of the services into the MoD, one can assume that they are generally not supportive of further integration of the military services.⁴⁸ Lastly, the belief that India does not need joint operational commands because these are seen to only be useful for power projection is fairly widespread in the army, air force and in the bureaucracy as per many accounts.⁴⁹

When some officials on the GoM task force, like Arun Singh, pushed for the establishment of theatre commands, there was strong resistance against further integrated command, for the above-mentioned reasons.⁵⁰ The argument given in favour of this was that the existing system had worked well and did not need to be changed.⁵¹ In addition, many felt that theatre commands were unsuited in the Indian context where defence of territory and not power projection remains a priority.⁵² The reformers had a difficult balancing act to perform and a less radical compromise solution was achieved.⁵³ Instead of a CDS, there would be a limited Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), and two experimental integrated commands: the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC).⁵⁴

The Andaman and Nicobar Command

The Andaman and Nicobar islands are situated in a central location in the Bay of Bengal. They are only 160 km from Indonesia and 45 km from Myanmar's Coco Islands, and are astride the western end of the Malacca Strait. In contrast, they are 1,200 km from the Indian mainland. About 600 islands and islets make up the two island chains, but it is possible to develop infrastructure only on 10–12 of these.⁵⁵ As with most island territories, it supplements India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by making up a massive 30 per cent of it.⁵⁶ Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean are critical in terms of the increasing amounts of goods and energy supplies that a rapidly growing India needs.⁵⁷ While geography would seem to indicate the importance of these islands, it is interesting to note that it took the Indian government several decades to invest in them.⁵⁸

In contrast, since at least the 1940s several other powers have appreciated the strategic importance of the islands. The Imperial Japanese army seized them from the British during the Second World War.⁵⁹ There was some discussion in the British leadership after the war about maintaining British rule over the islands even after independence because of their strategic location, but this did not happen.⁶⁰ Some thinkers within the Congress leadership did appreciate the importance of the islands. Even before independence, the historian and diplomat K.M. Pannikar identified the Andaman and Nicobar islands both in terms of a vulnerable frontier that needed to be protected and as an area from which to project power:

The strategic area in Indian warfare was not so much Burmese frontier, as Malaya, Singapore and the neglected Andaman Islands . . . The possession of the Andamans and the Nicobars gives to India strategic bases which if fully utilized in co-ordination with air power can convert the Bay of Bengal into a secure area.⁶¹

Reportedly, Nehru appreciated the importance of the islands as well, seeing them as an anchor for his Pan-Asian policies of the late 1940s and early 1950s, to counterbalance the natural tilt of Delhi towards West and Central Asia.⁶²

However, the islands were never a focus for Indian foreign and security policy in the first 20 years of independence. It was only in the 1960s that security threats to the islands came to the attention of Delhi. These included tensions with Burma and Indonesia over sovereignty of some of the islands, the utilisation of some islands by Burmese militia groups for arms and drug smuggling, encroachments by illegal squatters and fish poaching in particular, given the sheer size of the island chain and the large number of mostly uninhabited islands.⁶³

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Indian military presence on the islands was expanded beyond modest naval and coast guard forces.⁶⁴ In 1981, the command of the islands was upgraded to Fortress Andaman and Nicobar (FORTAN) with a rear admiral in command.⁶⁵ Along with new command arrangements, military assets also increased with the addition of an infantry brigade and helicopters.⁶⁶ There were several reasons for this expansion, including a greater interest in the Indian Ocean region, the build-up of the Indian navy and India's 'Look East' policy of the 1990s that focused on strengthening relations with South East Asia.⁶⁷

In order to minimise the threat to these neighbours, one of the major functions of the command was to increase military-to-military cooperation with South East Asia.⁶⁸ Over the past 15–20 years, forces deployed to FORTAN have proved useful for building maritime links with Thailand and Singapore, and repairing relations with Malaysia and Indonesia.⁶⁹ India also started inviting South East Asian countries to participate in the MILAN exercises in 1995.⁷⁰ These efforts helped in giving India a larger role in the region, especially when India became a 'dialogue partner' of the ASEAN and then a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996.⁷¹

By the end of the 1990s and particularly since 2000, there have been Indian concerns about Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean.⁷² This has mainly been because of Chinese military and dual-use infrastructure development in Burma/Myanmar.⁷³ In the late 1990s and early 2000s, these concerns only increased with further Chinese dual-use infrastructure developments in Sittwe and a potential Kra Isthmus Canal in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar in Pakistan.⁷⁴ By the close of the first decade of the 20th century, it seemed that Chinese analysts also came to realise the importance of the islands. These concerns focused upon the perceived leverage that the islands give to India over important SLOCs, in particular the Malacca Strait.⁷⁵

These developments seem to have spurred the Vajpayee government to upgrade the status of the islands. In January 1999, the minister for defence, George Fernandes, visited the islands and referred to the Andamans as India's 'farthest frontier' and the most 'insecure region'.⁷⁶ Both Arun Singh, one of the leading figures in the GoM task force, and Fernandes were interested in developing the capabilities of the command.⁷⁷ These efforts of the Vajpayee government were overtaken by events—the surprise of the Kargil War, which was followed by the setting up of the KRC and the GoM in 1999 and 2001. The GoM report warned, 'The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, far removed from the Indian mainland, are increasingly vulnerable particularly in the context of the emergence of the Islamic separatist movement in Aceh'.⁷⁸ Moreover, the report recommended that:

In view of the growing strategic importance of the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands, the replacement of the Fortress Commander Andaman and Nicobar (FORTAN) by a Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command has now become necessary. This Command may jointly control the assets of the three Services and the Coast Guard and would be the first Joint Command

in the country. This proposal may be processed by the MoD and approval of the competent authority obtained expeditiously. The Commander of the Andaman and Nicobar Command may report to the CDS.⁷⁹

The primary duties of this command include:

- Defence of the territorial integrity, waters and airspace of the islands;
- Ensuring that eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean remain free from threats for unhindered passage of shipping;
- Monitoring of SLOCs in designated AOR [Area of Responsibility];
- Exercising surveillance over EEZ;
- Establishment of an ADIZ [Air Defence Identification Zone] for air defence and air space control; and
- Undertaking joint planning for contingencies and infrastructure planning.⁸⁰

Again, it must be stressed that for all the attention that the security analysis gave the command, the assets and even the role of the ANC are relatively modest and are focused more on congratulatory roles rather than on building up a base for power projection past the Malacca Strait.⁸¹ A decade after the formation of the command, its assets remain: one army infantry brigade; 5–6 air force transportation helicopters; 5–6 naval patrol boats; and some amphibious and landing craft.⁸² It is also reported that the support infrastructure on the islands is barely able to handle the constabulary duties, let alone being a major military base for deterring a major power.⁸³

It must, however, be said, on looking back a decade later, that the ANC has been quite successful as an experiment or ‘crucible for jointness’. Most officers who have commanded or served in the islands, no matter what their service, have been very positive about how well jointness has worked.⁸⁴ There were many problems to work out, in particular with regard to budgets, logistics, and communications, but these were resolved with innovative and practical solutions.⁸⁵ For example, when the first army commander-in-chief arrived, it was made sure that he had a naval chief of staff to assist him with regard to maritime issues.⁸⁶

This is not to say there have been no difficulties with the ANC. The difficulties have focused upon three broad areas: (1) lack of interest of some services and the mainland; (2) problems with the civilian support staff; and (3) problems with interfacing a joint command with non-joint services back on the mainland. As to the first point, the services in varying degrees have a tendency not to be very interested in the ANC. At various times they have stopped funding or removed assets from islands when needed, and have not been interested in stationing valuable assets there.⁸⁷ Secondly, in the first couple of years, one persistent difficulty was finding adequate numbers of civilian staff to work at the ANC.⁸⁸ However, there have been some administrative reforms in the past couple of years that appear to have mitigated many of these problems.⁸⁹ Lastly, there have been problems with having a joint command ‘outpost’ amidst a larger defence establishment that is decidedly non-joint. In the words of one MoD official: ‘[CinC ANC] has got the powers to execute whatever he has been directed to do. Whatever orders are given, he has to execute, but the instruments of execution are under Component Commanders which are Service-specific’.⁹⁰ For example, each service maintains its own legal codes and jurisdictions, which can cause problems.⁹¹ More difficult has been the dependence of the ANC on the mainland for food and refitting of its military assets.⁹² As the prime minister’s envoy stated in 2009: ‘It is my experience

that “outposts” tend to become just that. They command only episodic attention from decision makers and certainly only limited claim on budgetary resources’.⁹³

Conclusion

There are a couple of points that one must return to. Why the ANC for India’s first theatre command? And will there be more integrated commands in the future?

Why ANC?

The development of the ANC does not match up well with the traditional explanation of internal balancing against an external threat, meaning China. We would really need to see a radical shift in thinking about the ANC as an exposed outpost to be defended, to a defence asset or force multiplier for control of the Bay of Bengal.⁹⁴ As stated earlier, the command has concentrated on the roles of (1) constabulary and non-traditional security in the islands and their surrounding waters; and (2) military and diplomatic engagement with ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific powers.⁹⁵ There are indications that the ANC as conceptualised today is merely the foundation for a larger and more important command for dealing with more conventional contingencies in the future (i.e. China), but evidence for this is rather fragmentary.⁹⁶

While there is concern in Delhi about the rise of China and Chinese efforts to build infrastructure for potential entry into the Indian Ocean in the future, it needs to be put into a longer-term perspective. Most experts feel that although conflict is not inevitable between these two major Asian states in the future, there will be a critical moment 10–15 years from now when both powers will have the capacity to enter into each other’s regions.⁹⁷ Many observers have noted that the Indian efforts to monitor and possibly counter Chinese expansion into South East Asia and the Indian Ocean have been cautious and usually in reaction to Chinese actions, rather than preventive measures. In the words of John Garver:

It also responded to the growing Chinese involvement in Burma’s maritime sector by strengthening its naval presence in the Andaman Islands. Again, the pattern seems to be one of India responding to, accommodating, the expansion of the Chinese presence, rather than finding an effective way to thwart the growth of that presence.⁹⁸

In answer to the first question, it must be said that of all the possible joint operational theatre commands for India, the ANC was the easiest to organise. As mentioned earlier, Arun Singh and other members of the GoM were enthusiastic about theatre commands, but apparently ran into opposition from other members of the task force. However, the navy offered the command as a ‘crucible/experiment’.⁹⁹ As Admiral Arun Prakash put it: ‘ANC came virtually as a gift from the IN [Indian navy], and was a net gain for the other two Services’.¹⁰⁰ Since the navy gave up the command, it did not come into conflict with the other services whereas a more important area would have created a conflict among the services (in particular one on a land border or one with large numbers of army assets assigned to it).

Secondly, the command creation was less controversial since there was a foundation of jointness in the islands for the past decade or more.¹⁰¹ While much is made of the ANC as the formation of the first service command in 2001, it must be said that from the late 1980s FORTAN was effectively a tri-service command in practice, if not

formally.¹⁰² Because of the nature of the territory, the need for cooperation to deal with non-traditional security issues, the wide variety of small islands and islands, narrow and/or shallow waters, the sheer size of the territory and so on, the three services, plus the coast guard, had to work together in order to effectively patrol and monitor the islands.¹⁰³

Moreover, the small size of the forces deployed and their isolation from mainland India made development of a 'working jointness' both relatively easy and also inevitable.¹⁰⁴ This is true both in terms of ease of working together and in terms of the services being 'willing to give them up'. Small assets like a handful of helicopters, or patrol boats consigned to an isolated position, are far easier to cede to a theatre command than squadrons of advanced aircraft or a strike corps in a critical location along the Pakistani or Chinese border.¹⁰⁵ For example, the air force argues that with the increase of range with air-to-air refuelling techniques, mainland-based Indian fighters have the range to cover almost all of the Indian Ocean region, rendering pre-deployment to the ANC (or other potential theatre commands) superfluous.¹⁰⁶

From most indicators the ANC has been successful. There have been problems, such as difficulties with civilian staff shortages and problems with integrating services, but many of these were to be expected. However, the ANC has had two stand-out successes: the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the reduction in poaching incidents. The devastation inflicted upon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands by the 2004 tsunami was quite horrific, and according to one former commander, the situation was as close to the conditions of actual warfare that one could get short of combat, given the level of devastation and chaos.¹⁰⁷ The three services, the coast guard and the civilian administration were able to respond well to the disaster, not only in terms of dealing with devastation on the islands but also in coordinating disaster response in the region. Secondly, poaching incidents have dropped sharply in the years since the creation of the ANC.¹⁰⁸ In summary, the ANC is widely seen as a success in its region, even by those who are against more theatre commands for India.

Organisational learning and future integrated commands

In the summer of 2011, the Indian government announced the formation of the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security. The common theme that emerges from many of the editorials of the task force was the question of whether or not there would be any recommendations on setting up more integrated commands.¹⁰⁹ The primary insight from the organisational learning is that most organisational change will be of the first or second order, and will rarely involve fundamental change unless those who believe in a new paradigm reach positions of authority and force a re-conceptualisation of the structures and issues at hand. When one examines the slow pace of change in both higher defence in India in general and the development of the ANC in particular, it matches well with the predictions of first- and second-order change.¹¹⁰ The change proposed and partially implemented by the GoM report would constitute second-order change. As Admiral J.G. Nadkarni offered, 'Incremental changes are far easier to digest than a monumental overhaul, which can easily throw the entire set-up into chaos for years'.¹¹¹

Given the earlier discussion about the resistance to jointness and joint operating command, it is unlikely that there will be more theatre commands created in the near future. The conventional wisdom, even among those who want theatre commands and view the ANC as a success, is that it is too early to replicate the ANC for other commands.¹¹² What made the ANC work is that it was not seen as important by most of

the services and the bureaucracy, and the assets deployed are acceptable to be 'lost' to a theatre command. In more traditionally vital areas with large assets, this will raise difficult questions of how to portion out valuable assets.¹¹³ Perhaps more difficult would be how to decide whether some commands would be assigned to a specific service, or whether there would be rotation by services as in the case of the US. Given the sheer size of the army and its pre-eminence in terms of territorial defence, it would be difficult to find a solution to this and balance it with the air force's traditional fear of being subsumed by the army and being treated as a supporting service.¹¹⁴ So it seems unlikely that more joint operational theatre commands will be set up until the political leadership forces change on both the bureaucracy and the services.

Additionally, two things need to be kept in mind. Firstly, just because the US has established such commands does not mean that every other country must follow in the US's footsteps. Secondly, the US experience was long and drawn out and not straightforward. With regard to the first point, while there has been a general move towards jointness in many defence establishments at least since the Second World War, there is no single, universal model of integration. Because of the power and size of the US and its armed forces, there is a tendency to see the US as a model to emulate. One extreme, as we have mentioned, has been India, with very little top-down integration until the early 2000s. Another extreme has been Canada, with a completely integrated single service since 1968 supported by various integrated functional commands (Communication Command, Air Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, and so on).¹¹⁵

It must also be said that while these terms are often used interchangeably, there are also some differences between the American concept of a chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and a British/Commonwealth-style chief of defence staff. In the US context, the chairman is not an operational commander and operations are commanded by joint operational theatre commanders (combatant commanders).¹¹⁶ In contrast, many of the Commonwealth countries have a CDS that originally commanded the forces, but since the 1990s most of these countries have taken operational command away from the CDS and given it to a joint operational expeditionary command under it.¹¹⁷

As far as the second point is concerned, the US experience when viewed in the long term does not stand out as always being an example of foresight and rationality. Even in the US, the establishment of full jointness was a slow and often painful process lasting 40 years from the Second World War until the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.¹¹⁸ Those who lambast the slow nature of change in the Indian system would do well to remember how difficult the US experience was and how that change was forced on the services by Congress.

In India also, jointness is unlikely to come from within the services themselves, so reforms would need to come from parliamentary intervention.¹¹⁹ For example, to make jointness work, a critical component that will need to be implemented is to make joint service a requirement for promotion to incentivise officers and for their services to value it, and this will need to come from outside the services.¹²⁰ However, with a few exceptions, most elected politicians are not interested in defence issues and are unwilling to spend political capital on pushing difficult reforms that challenge both the services and the bureaucracy. Comparing the American and Indian cases, K. Subrahmanyam noted in one of his last interviews:

As a matter of fact, the creation of a Department of Defence in the United States had also met with stiff resistance. While taking major decisions on strategic bombers and aircraft carriers,

the decision had to be taken by sacking six admirals in a single day—thus, exhibiting strength of character by the political class in the US. Change is always resisted and has to be enforced. Unfortunately, we do not have such people in India at present . . . The NSC in the US came into being as a result of legislation as did the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In India, the difficulty arises since our Parliament does not even debate the reports that have been tabled in the Parliament. The Parliament today is defaulting on its principal role of governance[.]¹²¹

The stalled reforms recommended by the KRC and the GoM indicate that it is also unlikely that reform will be supported by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has in many cases simply ignored the recommendations or has delayed their implementation, even when asked directly by the Parliament Standing Committee on Defence.¹²² A telling example of this delay on the part of the bureaucracy emerged during the Standing Committee's 36th Report (14th Lok Sabha), entitled 'Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces', in 2008–2009. In this report, members of the Committee had asked the MoD why they had not acted upon recommendations to allow greater participation and integration of military officers in policymaking issues. The reply was, 'We do not really feel the need frankly'.¹²³

So it seems unlikely that more joint operational theatre commands will be set up in the near term unless another Kargil level disaster/surprise happens that forces the political leadership to force change on both the bureaucracy and the services.¹²⁴ This is not to say that there is no chance for any more integrated commands in the future. There is less opposition, in particular from the army, to having more functional commands. In this sense, the Strategic Forces Command, more so than the ANC, will be a model and other likely candidates are often said to be integrated commands for space, cyber, special forces, acquisitions, logistics, and so on.¹²⁵ The SFC rotates through the three services, and brings together members from not only the services, but also civilian organisations.¹²⁶ The creation of a 'joint functional civilian command' for disaster management, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2005 shows that there is a certain momentum towards function integration in order to deal with the challenges of non-traditional security issues.¹²⁷ Lastly, functional joint operational commands also overcome one the largest objections to theatre commands: how to divide up commands between services when a service views a particular geographic region as 'their' region given the deployed assets and operations there.¹²⁸

Organisational learning and Indian history indicate that in order for third-order change or drastic reform to happen, there needs to be a 'shock' to make policymakers, military leaders and even the informed public re-examine their beliefs on security.¹²⁹ This will give civilian policymakers the incentive to force integration on services that will be reluctant to accept change, and will also empower 'mavericks' or reformers from inside the services that will partner with the civilian reformers.¹³⁰

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Anit Mukherjee, A. Vinod Kumar and Wallace Thies for their comments on an earlier draft. All remaining shortcomings are my own.

Notes

1. There are several related terms that are often used for these commands: integrated commands, joint commands, tri-service commands (especially in the Indian context), unified commands, etc. The author has settled upon 'joint operational command' as the best term for this article.

2. These have unified all the services (army, navy, air force, etc.) and also have support from seconded civilians from other federal departments and agencies (State Department, Intelligence, USAID, etc.).
3. James Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2002, pp. 444–447. However, integrated theatre commands are not silver bullets, and while they seem to make conventional operations more effective, post-conflict operations, counter-insurgency and state-building campaigns like Afghanistan and Iraq remain difficult, protracted and costly.
4. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. For the merits of a theatre command system for India, see Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), *Indian Army: Vision 2020*, Harper Collins, Delhi, 2008, pp. 274–275. For forward presence, see Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work, *A New Global Defence Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era*, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2007.
5. Some have argued that because of their tremendous resources, the combatant commanders have become some of the most important actors in American foreign policy. Dana Priest went as far as calling them the ‘Proconsuls of Empire’. See Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military*, W.W. Norton, New York and London, 2004; see also Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*, Continuum, New York, 2011, pp. 74–76. For critiques of Priest’s arguments, see Howard Belote, ‘Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals’, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition*, 2004, NDU Press, Washington, 2004, pp. 1–20; and Mitchell Thompson, ‘Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power’, *Parameters*, 35(4), 2005–2006, pp. 62–75.
6. For the UK, see Richard Connaughton, ‘Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces’, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, August 2000, pp. 87–94. For France, see James Rogers and Luis Simon, *Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of the European Union and Their Potential Role for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*, Policy Department External Policies, Briefing Paper, February 19, 2009, p. 13. For Australia, see Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 247–249; and David Horner, ‘The Evolution of Australian Higher Command Arrangements’, *Command Paper 3*, Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, 2003.
7. In contrast to India, China has had joint regional commands and unified logistics command for several decades, and former superpower Russia moved in 2010 to joint strategic commands that include all three services. See David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2004, pp. 136–143, 146–149; and ‘Russia Sets up Four Strategic Commands’, *RIA Novosti*, July 14, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100714/159810197.html.
8. In the words of Admiral Nadkarni, ‘If we have a war in the west, for example, the Army Command will be in Pune, the Naval Commander in Mumbai and the Air Force Commander in Ahmedabad’, as quoted in Rahul Bhonsle, ‘Jointness: A Strategic Culture Perspective’, *Journal of Defence Studies*, 1(1), 2007, p. 98; see also Admiral J.B. Nadkarni, ‘India’s Forces Must Join or Perish’, *Rediff.com*, 8 June 2000, at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jun/08nadkar.htm>.
9. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1984; and James Locher, no. 3, pp. 448–449. However, one can also make the case that the traditional views see change as top down, and that bottom-up approaches have been mostly overlooked. See Keith Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-40*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1999; and Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29(5), 2006, pp. 905–934.
10. Barry Posen, no. 9, p. 226.
11. James Locher, no. 3, pp. 31–32, 437–450.
12. James Holmes, Andrew Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 94–95, 153–157.
13. Some have suggested that one of the reasons for the incremental approach of Indian defence reform is the lack of an Indian strategic culture. See Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8; and Harsh Pant, ‘India’s Search for a Foreign Policy’, *Orbis*, Spring 2009, p. 258.
14. See Peter Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’, *Comparative Politics*, April 1993, p. 279.

15. Ibid., p. 282.
16. Ibid., p. 281.
17. Ibid., p. 288.
18. In particular, Eisenhower's decision to run against and bring the Republican Party away from its isolationist wing led by Taft and towards a bipartisan Cold War consensus on foreign policy. See Samuel Huntington, *For the Common Defence: Strategic Problems in National Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1961; John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004; and Douglas Stuart, *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2008. For more specifically on learning in foreign policy, see the classic, George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1991.
19. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'Jointness in the Indian Forces', in *From the Crow's Nest: A Compendium of Speeches and Writings on Maritime and Other Issues*, Lancer, Delhi, 2007, p. 17. Service HQs are 'attached' to the government, not formally part of it. See *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, Sage, Delhi, 2000, p. 259; and *22nd Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, 14th Lok Sabha, July 2006, p. 4.
20. Stephen Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 175–177; Jaswant Singh, *Defending India*, MacMillan Press, London, 1999, pp. 109–112; and author's interview with General (ret.) V.K. Nayer, Delhi, January 2010.
21. In the words of Raju Thomas, 'Unlike counterpart systems in other parts of the world, the Ministry of Defence in India consists of civil servants and functions separately from the armed service headquarters. This has not only tended to create a general lack of coordination and cooperation but has also raised suspicions and mistrust between civil servants and military officers.' Raju Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986, p. 124.
22. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 208–216, 221–232, 239–244; Singh, *Defending India*, no. 20, pp. 107–108; Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 75–76; and Anit Mukherjee, 'The Absent Dialogue', *Seminar*, July 2009, pp. 25–26. In the words of retired General Dipanker Banerjee, 'Over the years a healthy tradition has developed that keeps the military at all levels and ranks insulated and at a safe distance from politicians and the political system'. See Dipanker Banerjee, 'India: Military Professionalism of a First-World Army', in Muthiah Alagappa, *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*, East-West Center, Honolulu, 2001, p. 24.
23. Raju Thomas, no. 21, pp. 129–130; and Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'India's Higher Defence Organisation: Implications for National Security and Jointness', *Journal of Defence Studies*, 1(1), 2007, p. 29. One could also argue they have an additional third hat in terms of the heavy ceremonial role they play in terms of how much time they spend in ceremony, trooping the colours, receiving dignitaries at the airport, etc. My thanks to P.R. Chari on this point.
24. For example, the disastrous war with China in 1962, the intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987–1990, the intelligence failure in the Kargil Conflict and the ineffective use of coercive diplomacy following the December 2001 parliament attack. Srinath Raghavan, 'Civil-Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 32(1), 2009, pp. 170–171; Peter Lavoy (ed.), *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009; and Patrick Bratton, 'Signals and Orchestration: India's Use of Compellence during the 2001–02 Crisis', *Strategic Analysis*, 34(4), 2010, 594–610. The dispatch of the forces to the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka in particular has problems of command and control, multiple chains of command, lack of service cooperation, and lack of civil–military coordination. For more details, see General Harikat Singh (ret.), *Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold*, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 2007, especially pp. 30–68, 75–85, 123–137; and Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*, Routledge, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 87–96. That is not to say there have not been moments when this system seems to have worked, in particular the 1971 war with Pakistan. However, it is often countered that success in that war was due to the unique balance of personalities, which is unlikely to be the case in most conflicts. Integrated cooperation

- again had to be on an ad hoc basis during the Kargil War and again depended heavily on the personalities to work together. See General V.P. Malik (ret.), *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory*, Harper Collins, Delhi, 2005, pp. 121–122.
25. General V.P. Malik (ret.) and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), 'Defence Planning in India', *ORF Policy Brief*, 20 January 2005, pp. 8–9, at http://www.orfonline.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/policybrief/attachments/py050120_1162534133844.pdf; Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernization*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2010, pp. 151–152; and Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'India's Higher Defence Organisation', no. 23, p. 26. For example, in the 1965 war the army and air force seemed to fight their own war removed from the other services. See Raju Thomas, no. 21, p. 129.
 26. As quoted in 'First-Ever Joint War Doctrine Released', *The Hindu*, May 18, 2006; see also Vinod Anand, 'Integrating the Indian Military: Retrospect and Prospect', *Journal of Defence Studies*, 2(2), 2008, p. 33.
 27. Rajesh Basrur, 'Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India', in Peter Lavoy, no. 24, pp. 318–320.
 28. This was led by a fortuitous combination of leading political figures with a committed interest in defence (Arun Singh, Jaswant Singh, Brajesh Mishra), defence intellectuals (K. Subrahmanyam) and some reform minded flag rank officers (such as Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.) and Admiral Das).
 29. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Report of the Kargil Review Committee: An Appraisal', *CLAWS Journal*, Summer 2009, p. 19.
 30. *Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security*, Government of India, New Delhi: 2001, pp. 100–104. The CDS was not a surprising recommendation, since there have been recommendations and proposals for a CDS for some time, at least since the 1960s and 1970s. The idea for integrated commands was somewhat newer. See Raju Thomas, no. 21, p. 158; Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), *Indian Army Vision 2020*, no. 4, pp. 271–274; and S.L. Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1999, pp. 546–549.
 31. *Kargil Review Committee Report*, no. 19, p. 258. Service HQs are 'attached' to the government, not formally part of it. *Kargil Review Committee Report*, no. 19, p. 259.
 32. *22nd Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 19, p. 4.
 33. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. For more details see the *Indian Maritime Doctrine*, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Navy, Delhi, 2009, especially pp. 79–84, 105–122.
 34. These include disaster response, piracy, counter-terrorism in the littorals, etc. This was born out of a series of interviews by the author with several serving and retired naval officers in Delhi in June and July 2011, and the writings of pro-integration naval officers such as Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), General Vijay Oberoi (ret.) and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.). However, one has to speculate that the navy would object to losing its naval air arm or maritime commandos if these were deemed to be redundant in a future rationalisation of defence assets under a joint umbrella. My thanks to A. Vinod Kumar on this point.
 35. There are also concerns that given the land bias of civilians and the dominance of a large army, there is a lack of understanding of air operations. Author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011; and author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011.
 36. There is concern that the army in particular does not understand how to balance the importance and requirements of strikes in a conflict, and that there needs to be an 'educational' component of joint planning before top-down jointness can be implemented. Author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011; and author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011.
 37. See the classic statement on this by Air Marshal Jasjit Singh, 'Indivisible Air Power', in *India and the World: Selected Articles from IDSA Journals*, Vol. 1, Promilla & Co, Delhi, 2005, especially the following passage: 'while some gains may accrue from integrating elements of air power with, say land forces, the division and fragmentation of air power can only result, at best, in confusion and sub-optimal exploitation, and at its worst, in military disaster' (p. 185).
 38. Information in this paragraph is gathered from author's interview with Kapil Kak, June 24, 2011, Delhi; author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011; and R. Venkataraman, *India's Higher Defence: Organization and Management*, Knowledge World, Delhi, 2011. This reluctance in the air force for a CDS was commented upon back in

- the 1980s. See Raju Thomas, no. 21, p. 131. Also, in fairness, the air force perhaps has some justification for its concerns about its roles and independence given that since the 1970s both of the other services have encroached on its turf, in the form of the navy's development of naval aviation and the army's development of aviation units. Admiral Arun Prakash, 'India's Higher Defence Organisation', no. 23, p. 21.
39. R. Venkataraman, no. 38, pp. 235–236.
 40. See Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), *Indian Army Vision 2020*, no. 4, pp. 273–276; author's interviews with Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), Delhi, 24 June 2011 and General V.J. Oberoi (ret.), Delhi, July 5, 2011.
 41. The army has been used in internal security since the 1950s in the northeast. Starting in the 1980s and then the 1990s with the insurgencies in Punjab and especially Kashmir, a large portion of the Indian army has been involved in continuous internal counter-insurgency (COIN) operations for over 20 years. Author's interviews with senior retired army officers, Delhi, July 2011. See also similar comments by former Army Chief, V.P. Malik in *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory*, no. 24, pp. 364–365. For an in-depth discussion of the COIN operations, see Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis*, Sage, New Delhi, 2005; and Rajesh Rajagopalan, no. 24, especially pp. 134–168.
 42. One can disagree with this point, but it is widely expressed in the army. Author's interviews with army officers, January, Delhi, 2010; and senior retired army officers, Delhi, July 2011.
 43. Author's interview with retired senior army officers, July 2011.
 44. The author acknowledges there are different conceptions of what a CDS would look like, and also that there are questions as to whether or not a British/Commonwealth-style CDS and not a US-style Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the correct model for India to follow. However, 'CDS' has become the term in general use, for better or for worse. The late K. Subrahmanyam disagreed with the idea of a British-style CDS for India and wanted a more US-style Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. See the interview by Nitin Pai and Aruna Urs, 'The New Currency of Power: A Discussion on Strategic Affairs with K. Subrahmanyam', *Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review*, 14, May 2008, p. 13. For differences in conceptions of the powers and responsibilities of a CDS, see R. Venkataraman, no. 38, pp. 218–234.
 45. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'India's Higher Defence Organisation', no. 23, p. 29. The full quote reads: 'In India, the Service Chiefs have since Independence, continued to wear two hats; a "staff hat" as the Chief of Staff and an "operational hat" as the Commander-in-Chief of his force. This is an anachronism, and in all modern military organizations, the operational war-fighting responsibilities are delegated to designated Theatre Commanders, while the Service Chiefs are responsible only for recruitment, training and logistics of the armed forces. This issue was not addressed by the GoM, but is linked very closely to the CDS format. One would like to emphasize the fact that since no Chief would like to preside over his own divestment, it is unrealistic to expect a favourable recommendation for the CDS system from the Services.'
 46. See the comments by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Report of the Kargil Review Committee', no. 29, p. 20.
 47. Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, no. 25, pp. 162–163. They rotate quite frequently through posts. In their study of the higher civil service, Krishnan and Somanathan find that consistently from 1978 to 1996 about 50–55% (varying from 48 to 60%) of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) members spend less than one year in a post, and 25–30% (varying from 22 to 31%) spend one to two years. So effectively 70–80% of the service spends no more than two years, and frequently only one year, in any given post. Moreover, the promotion system in the IAS is based upon seniority and promotions are only denied by mistake. So there are no structural incentives 'there is no specific career incentive linked to the acquisition of knowledge or competence either through formal study or through specialization or on-the-job learning'. See K.P. Krishnan and T.V. Somanathan, 'Civil Service: An Institutional Perspective', in Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mahta (eds.), *Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2005, pp. 258–259, 296–297.
 48. As MoD officials admitted to the Standing Committee on Defence (February 2009), 'Renaming of Army and Naval Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters is merely cosmetic'. See *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, 14th Lok Sabha (2008–09), 'Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces', p. 16. This resistance to change is not new. See, for example, arguments against the creation of a CDS back in 1968 by the then Defence Secretary P.V.R. Rao, 'Governmental Machinery for the Evolution of National

- Defence Policy and the Higher Direction of War', in *India and the World*, no. 37, pp. 70–71. See also S.L. Menezes, no. 30, p. 548; Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'India's Higher Defence Organisation', no. 23, p. 22; and Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8, p. 100.
49. P.V.R. Rao, no. 48, pp. 70–71; author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011; author's interviews with army officers, Delhi, January 2010 and senior retired army officers, Delhi, July 2011; author's interview with Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011; and author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011.
 50. Anit Mukherjee, *Failing to Deliver: Post-Crisis Defence Reforms in India, 1998–2010*, IDSA, Delhi, 2010, p. 19; author's interviews with naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011; author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011; author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
 51. R. Venkataraman, no. 38, p. 221.
 52. Raju Thomas, no. 21, pp. 131–132; Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8, p. 98; and author's interview with retired senior army officers, July 2011. However, a case can be made that since the 1980s, the Indian armed services have been involved in several expeditionary operations, such as interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives and evacuating civilians from war zones as far away as Iraq, Lebanon and even Libya. Moreover, there is a growing diplomatic role for the military as India increases its participation in military-to-military exchanges, exercises and disaster response. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011. See also K.A. Muthanna, *Enabling Military-to-Military Cooperation as a Foreign Policy Tool: Options for India*, Knowledge World, Delhi, 2006.
 53. In the words of Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'The task force faced a dilemma. If it overbid its hand, it was possible that we would frighten the politicians and the recommendations would be consigned to gather dust in a musty cupboard. On the other, this was the first opportunity in half a century to rectify much that was wrong with the nation's security edifice.' As quoted in R. Venkataraman, no. 38, p. 176.
 54. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011; and Anit Mukherjee, *Failing to Deliver*, no. 50, p. 19.
 55. Vijay Sakhujia, *Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions in China, India and Southeast Asia*, Singapore, ISEAS, 2011, p. 57; and Pushpita Das, 'Securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', *Strategic Analysis*, 35(3), 2011, p. 466.
 56. G.S. Khurana, 'Shaping Security in India's Maritime East: Role of Andaman & Nicobar', *Strategic Analysis*, 30(1), 2006, p. 164; and Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', in *From the Crow's Nest*, no. 19, pp. 142–143.
 57. For energy, see Charles Ebinger's chapter 'India', in Charles Ebinger, *Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 15–60.
 58. As one retired admiral jokingly said to the author, 'Everyone except the Indian government saw the importance of the island's strategic location'. In many ways Delhi's neglect of the islands dovetailed with the general 'maritime blindness' that marked Indian policymaking in the 1950s to the 1970s. See Harsh Pant, 'India's Growing Naval Power: Indian Ocean in Focus', in Geoffrey Till and Patrick Bratton (eds.), *Seapower and the Asia-Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 113–114. For a view of the importance of the islands, see Vijay Sakhujia, no. 55, pp. 107–108, and on the shift away from 'maritime blindness' pp. 90–92.
 59. In March 1942, the Japanese seized the islands during the Indian Ocean raid. The seizure was not resisted by the British since it was felt the islands were indefensible after the capture of Burma. For more details see David Thomas, *The Battle of the Java Sea*, Stein and Day, New York, 1968; and Jayant Dasgupta, *Japanese in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands*, Manas, Delhi, 2002.
 60. R.V.R. Murthy, *Andaman and Nicobar Islands: A Geo-political and Strategic Perspective*, North Book Centre, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 114–115. It seems Jinnah also wanted to lay claim to the islands as part of East Pakistan. See Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 143.
 61. K.M. Panikkar, *India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History*, George Allen and Unwin, Bombay, 1961, pp. 85, 96.
 62. Author's interview with P.R. Chari, Delhi, July 5, 2011. Also Christophe Jaffrelot, 'India's Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective', in Christophe Jaffrelot, *Religion, Caste and Politics in India*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 719–725.

63. Vijay Sakhuja, no. 55, pp. 66, 205; Pushpita Das, no. 55, pp. 468–470. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, *India's Maritime Security*, IDSA/Knowledge World, Delhi, 2000, p. 64; G.S. Khurana, no. 56, pp. 166–171; and author's interviews with several serving and retired naval officers in Delhi in June and July 2011.
64. Author's interview with retired senior naval officer, Delhi, June 2011. Author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, 24 June 2011; Pushpita Das, no. 55, pp. 471–472.
65. R.V.R. Murthy, no. 60, pp. 118–119.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 119. As will be discussed later, one can make a strong case that FORTAN was effectively a joint command before it formally became one.
67. This is not to say that the forces in the Andamans were the only reasons India joined these forums. They were part of a large foreign policy process. For more details see Pankaj Kumar Jha, 'India's Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Defence Studies*, 5(1), 2011, p. 50.
68. Vijay Sakhuja, no. 55, pp. 197–205; G.S. Khurana, no. 56, p. 173; author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, 24 June 2011; author's interviews with Indian naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011; author's interview with senior retired air force officer, June 2011; author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011.
69. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 145; Manjeet Pardesi, 'Southeast Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Positioning India as a Major Power in Asia', in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 118–125; and David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 214–216. It must be remembered that up until the 1980s India's relations with most of South East Asia except for Vietnam were relatively poor. See Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, no. 22, p. 255.
70. The MILAN exercises bring together the navies of most of the ASEAN states and other regional powers and have been conducted most years since 1995, with India and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands being the host. Vijay Sakhuja, no. 55, p. 198; 'Multi-nation Navy Exercise at Andaman', *The Times of India*, February 2, 2010. More generally, see G.S. Khurana, no. 56, p. 173; Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 144; and Pushpita Das, no. 55, p. 471.
71. Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, no. 22, p. 252.
72. Harsh Pant, 'India's Growing Naval Power', no. 58, pp. 117–121. However, it must be noted that Indian concerns about Chinese interest in South East Asia are not new. In the 1940s, Panikkar thought that China would again look towards South East Asia once internal conflict was resolved. See K.M. Panikkar, no. 61, pp. 85–86.
73. The first development that received attention in India was the purported Chinese setting up of a listening post on Coco Island (18–20 km away) in 1992–1993. G.S. Khurana, no. 56, p. 172.
74. The original term dates back to a Booz, Allen and Hamilton report, 'Energy Futures in Asia'. See 'China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes', *The Washington Times*, January 17, 2005.
75. Pushpita Das, no. 55, pp. 474–475. As one Chinese naval analyst writes, 'The islands are a "metal chain" that could lock shut the Malacca Strait'. Another writer worries not only about potential Indian denial of SLOCs but also the use of the islands for projecting power, that 'With the help of the Andaman-Nicobar island as a strategic springboard, a leg of India's "go east" strategy is already stretching toward the Asia-Pacific'. As quoted in Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, Random House, New York, 2010, pp. 125–126; and James Holmes, Andrew Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, no. 12, pp. 134–135. It is interesting to note that Indian authors have also made the same point about the Andamans as a 'springboard'. See G.S. Khurana, no. 56, p. 178; and Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 140.
76. Fernandes reportedly supported upgrading the quality of the defence infrastructure of the islands and in 'August 1999, the Defence Ministry principally agreed to establish of a "Far Eastern Maritime Command" at Port Blair, independent of the operational control of Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam'. R.V.R. Murthy, no. 60, p. 122; and author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
77. There were also some concerns about there not being enough assets for a full naval command. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
78. *Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security*, no. 30, p. 10.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103.

80. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 147. The actual document that laid out the primary duties and roles of the command is classified, but Prakash's points represent the essence of that document. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), personal communication with the author, December 13, 2011.
81. G.S. Khurana, no. 56, p. 173.
82. N.C. Bipindra, 'India to up Defences in Andamans, Lakshadweep', *The Economic Times*, June 27, 2011, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-27/news/29709040_1_military-infrastructure-and-force-diglipur-andamans; and author's interview with active and retired Indian naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011.
83. Pushpita Das, no. 55, p. 473. It must also be stated that there are important differences between the capacities of this command and an equivalent American combatant command like PACOM. The ANC consists of the three services plus the coast guard, and there is not a large intelligence or diplomatic contingent like one would have at PACOM. Author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011.
84. Author's interviews with active and retired Indian naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011; author's interview with retired senior army officers, July 2011; author's interview with Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011; and author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011. See also G.S. Khurana, no. 56; and Pushpita Das, no. 55.
85. In particular getting spare parts, since mainland units get priority over those in the ANC. Author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011; see also Pushpita Das, no. 55, pp. 473–474.
86. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
87. This ambivalence is most marked in the air force, which has not been interested in positioning either a large number of assets or high-quality assets such as fighters with strike capacity. This position is not without some reason given the level of devastation the 2004 tsunami caused to Car Nicobar airfield, and the reality that more has to be done to develop infrastructure (in particular port facilities and extending runways). G.S. Khurana, no. 56, pp. 176–177; Pushpita Das, no. 55, p. 473; author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011; author's interview with General Gumeet Kanwal (ret.), Delhi, June 24, 2011; and author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011.
88. In 2009, supposedly only seven posts were filled out of a total of 115. This was largely due to the unattractiveness of the posting to civilians given the lack of amenities, the distance from the mainland, and not having quality schools for their dependents. Anit Mukherjee, *Failing to Deliver*, no. 50, p. 38; Vinod Anand, 'Debating Defence Reforms Since Kargil', *CLAWS Journal*, Summer 2009, p. 91; *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 48, p. 14; and *2nd Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, 14th Lok Sabha, 'Action Take Report on the Recommendations/Observations of the Committee Contained in the 36th Report (14th Lok Sabha) on "Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces"', pp. 25–26; and author's interviews with several serving and retired naval officers in Delhi in June and July 2011.
89. These have included recommendations by the Standing Committee on Defence to authorise the Commander in Chief (CinC) aide de camp (ADC) to recruit directly. *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 48, pp. 25–26; and author's interview with retired naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011.
90. As quoted in the *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 48, p. 19.
91. Indra Sen Singh, 'Uniform Code of Military Justice: Need of the Day', *The Purple Pages*, 1(2), 2007, pp. 92–97.
92. For example, while the ships are operationally under CinC ANC, they cannot be refitted there, and need to go back to Eastern Naval Command. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
93. Address by Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of PM, on 'India's Foreign Policy and the Andaman & Nicobar Islands', Port Blair, September 5, 2009, at http://maritimeindia.org/sites/all/files/pdf/Shyam_Saran_Address.pdf.
94. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
95. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 147.
96. For example, 'Andaman and Nicobar to Become Major Amphibious Base', PTI, February 8, 2010.

97. Author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011; author's interviews with retired naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011; author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011.
98. John Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2001, p. 386.
99. Author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011.
100. As quoted in R. Venkataraman, no. 38, p. 235.
101. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
102. There was a joint operations room at FORTAN. Author's interview with Indian naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011; and R. Venkataraman, no. 38, p. 235.
103. A curious aspect of the discussion about jointness in the Indian context is although the coast guard is independent of the navy, it is often left out of discussions of jointness even when physically present. For example, joint operational commands like the ANC are typically termed 'tri-service commands' in India even though the coast guard effectively makes the ANC a 'quad-service command'.
104. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 140.
105. Author's interview with retired senior Indian naval officer, Delhi, June 2011.
106. Author's interview with retired senior air force officer, Delhi, June 2011. One can also speculate that the air force also sees less of a role for itself in some of the non-traditional security issues in the Bay of Bengal. There is also concern in the air force for 'localitis', i.e. that the theatre commander starts to believe his command is more important than any other area and constantly asks for more and more resources. See G.S. Khurana, no. 56, pp. 176–177; and author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011.
107. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, pp. 139–140; and author's interviews with senior retired army officers, Delhi, July 24, 2011.
108. Pushpita Das, no. 55, pp. 471–472.
109. For example, see Arvind Gupta, 'The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security: A Timely Step', *IDSIA Comment*, June 25, 2011; General V.P. Malik and Anit Mukherjee, 'Jawaharlal Nehru and the Chief of Defence Staff', *IDSIA Issue Brief*, July 8, 2011; and Patrick Bratton, 'An American Perspective on India's Defence Reforms', *South Asia Monitor*, August 18, 2011, at <http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=article&nid=1013>.
110. This view matches well with the tradition of slow change in Indian governmental institutions, as expressed in the classic saying 'India easy to govern, hard to change'. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands', no. 56, p. 148; author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011; author's interview with Air Vice Marshal (ret.) Kapil Kak, Delhi, June 24, 2011; author's interview with retired Indian naval officers, Delhi, June–July 2011.
111. As quoted in R. Venkataraman, no. 38, p. 235.
112. Author's interviews with service and retired naval officers, June–July 2011.
113. Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8, pp. 98, 101.
114. Gurmeet Kanwal offers a possible division of commands with certain commands being assigned to a service and others rotating, with a total of six commands, two dedicated army ones, one that rotates between army and air force, one dedicated air force and navy command each, and one that rotates between all three services. See Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, *Indian Army*, no. 4, pp. 275–276. For background information, see Raju Thomas, no. 21, p. 130; Anit Mukherjee, *Failing to Deliver*, no. 50, p. 16; and author's interview with P.R. Chari, July 5, 2011. One could speculate that if the services ever reached the point where there was less need for a large manpower-intensive army to deal with internal and border security issues, this would allow for the services to be more 'balanced' in size and resources, and jointness and integrated commands could be easier, although given the sheer size of the army this is difficult to imagine in the near future.
115. See Wilf Lund, 'Integration and Unification of the Canadian Forces', Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt Naval & Military Museum, at http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/unification.html; and 'The CERCOM Mission Statement', website of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, at <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/about-notre/index-eng.asp>.
116. To further add to the confusion, there are even further differences in how some advocates conceptualise a CDS. For example, K. Subrahmanyam in his final years mentioned that he preferred the US concept of a chairman, rather than a British/Commonwealth CDS. See Nitin

- Pai and Aruna Urs, no. 44, p. 13. For an in-depth discussion about the varying conceptions of a CDS, see R. Venkataraman, no. 38, pp. 218–234.
117. The UK, Australia and Canada stand out here. The UK set up the Permanent Joint Headquarters in 1996, Australia the Headquarters Joint Operational Command in 2004, and Canada the Expeditionary Force Command in 2006. For more on the British experience see Franklyn Johnson, *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885–1959*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960; Franklyn Johnson, *Defence by Ministry: British Ministry of Defence, 1944–74*, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1980; Ian Speller, 'Inter-Service Rivalry: British Defence Policy, 1956–68', *RUSI Military History and Policy Series III: Reforming Defence – Learning Lessons from Past Defence Reviews*, Summer 2010, at www.rusi.org/militaryhistory/series3; and Richard Connaughton, no. 6. For Australia, see Jeffrey Grey, no. 6, pp. 247–249; and David Horner, no. 6. For Canada, Chris Maclean, 'Expeditionary Command: An Overview', *Frontline-Canada*, March–April 2006, pp. 22–23.
 118. For example, in the Second World War, while there was a single commander in the European theatre (Eisenhower), in the Asia-Pacific theatre there was a bewildering assortment of theatre commands: General Douglas MacArthur and the Southwest Pacific area; Admiral Chester Nimitz and the Pacific Ocean area; and in 1943, the addition of Louis Mountbatten with Southeast Asia Command. This division almost led to disaster during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This was continued in the Cold War with the maintenance of two unified commands in the Pacific (Far East Command and Pacific Command until 1957) and a lack of integration between the services all the way up to unification in 1986. For more on the complicated patchwork for the China–Burma–India theatre, see Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1941–45*, Vintage, London, 2011; for the Cold War, see James Locher, no. 3, pp. 200–212.
 119. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'India's Higher Defence Organisation', no. 23, p. 31; Anit Mukherjee, 'Facing Future Challenges: Defence Reforms in India', *RUSI Journal*, 156(5), 2011, p. 35; author's phone interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), June 13, 2011; and author's interview with General V.J. Oberoi (ret.), Delhi, July 5, 2011.
 120. See James Locher, no. 3, pp. 443–444; Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'Jointness in the Indian Armed Forces', no. 19, pp. 19–20; and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.), *Indian Army Vision 2020*, no. 4, p. 246.
 121. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Report of the Kargil Review Committee', no. 29, pp. 23, 25.
 122. Author's interview with General (ret.) V.K. Nayer, Delhi, January 2010; and S.L. Menezes, no. 30, p. 548. For example, during the 14th Lok Sabha in 2009–2010 the Standing Committee had to follow up on an inquiry about why their recommendations on increasing the level of interface between the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces were still missing. *2nd Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 88, p. 3.
 123. *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 48, p. 8. The exact question by the Committee was, 'Standing Committee on Defence wrote: 1.18 Referring to the background note furnished by the Ministry on the subject that an integrated headquarter would be merely cosmetic in the absence of posting of Department of Defence cadre officers at Service Headquarters and for participation in policy formulation, the Committee enquired about the difficulty being experienced in allowing them to participate in policymaking issues. In reply, the representative of the Ministry of Defence stated the above.'
 124. Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8, p. 91.
 125. Author's interview with retired senior army officers, July 2011; see also B.S. Sacher, 'Jointmanship in the Defence Forces: The Way Ahead', *Journal of Defence Studies*, 1(1), 2007, pp. 106–109; Rahul Bhonsle, no. 8, p. 101; and comments made by an unnamed witness to the Standing Committee on Defence, *36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence*, no. 48, pp. 12–13.
 126. R. Venkataraman, no. 38, pp. 184–185, 262–263.
 127. Admiral Arun Prakash (ret.), 'Role of Armed Forces in Disaster Management', in *From the Crow's Nest*, no. 19, p. 41; and website for the NDMA, at <http://ndma.gov.in/ndma/index.html>.
 128. Author's interview with retired senior army officers, July 2011.
 129. M.P. Anil Kumar, 'How the Govt Can Reform the Defence Set-up', *Rediff.com*, 4 August 2009, at <http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/aug/04/how-the-govt-can-reform-the-defence-set-up.htm>
 130. As happened with General Jones in the US context. See James Locher, no. 3, pp. 33–58.